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In my paper, I defend an interpretation according to which Aristotle thinks in Nicomachean 
Ethics (EN) that the rational aspect of soul is needed in discerning which ends of desire would 
be good. Many interpreters have traditionally supported this, ‘rationalist’ line of interpreting 
Aristotle’s theory of value cognition.The rationalist interpretation has, however, recently 
come under a novel challenge from Jessica Moss (2011, 2012), but has not yet received a 
defence. Moss attempts to resurrect now virtually abandoned ‘anti-rationalist’ interpretation, 
which claims, in a contrast to the rationalist one, that discerning good ends may require no 
activity from the rational aspect, but only non well-habituated non-rational desire. Moss’ 
interpretation appeals to certain Aristotle’s claims in De Anima (DA) 3, which, she thinks, 
show that non-rational phantasia suffices for discerning good ends if only accompanied with 
the habituated desire. Although I admit that her interpretation can successfully avoid some 
problems that earlier anti-rationalist interpretations faced with certain passages of EN, I also 
argue, however that it introduces some new problems, and (probably inadvertently) attributes 
philosophically incoherent views about moral responsibility to Aristotle. Therefore I conclude 
that even after Moss’ improvements to the anti-rationalist interpretation, the rationalist 





 In my paper, I defend an interpretation of Aristotle, according to which the 
rational aspect of soul is needed in discerning which potential ends of desire would be 
good.
1
 I argue that since not every potential end that we can desire is good, we have to 
discern good ends, and rational discernment (krisis) is required for this task. Without 
rational discernment, ability to focus on certain perceptions, we could not distinguish 
truly good ends from possibly pleasant, but ultimately bad ends. Since antiquity, 
authoritative commentators of Aristotle, including Aspasius, have supported this, 
rationalist line of interpreting his theory of value cognition, and it enjoys wide support 
                                                             
1
 I use the rational aspect of soul as an umbrella term for Aristotle’s concepts of to dianoetikon, to 
logikon and their variations such as to logou echon and to noetikon.  
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 The rationalist interpretation has, however, recently faced a novel 
challenge from Jessica Moss, against which it does not have yet received a defence.
3
 
She attempts to renew a now disregarded anti-rationalist interpretation, which 
emerged in the late 19
th
 century, but was subsequently disregarded and which claims, 
in contrast to the rationalist interpretation, that even discerning good ends may not 
involve the rational aspect of soul, but only the habituation of the opposite, non-





 century anti-rationalist interpreters, whose arguments I will review in the 
first part of my paper, argued for the non-rationality of value cognition by appealing 
in particular to EN 2.4, in which Aristotle says that moral virtue does not require 
knowledge, and to EN 3.3, which claims that we do not deliberate about the ends of 
our desires, but only about the means to them. Certain passages in EN 6 and 7, in 
which Aristotle assigns the task for providing us with good ends to moral virtue, may 
seem to reinforce these claims. The main reason for the scant following of this 
traditional anti-rationalist interpretation among later interpreters is, however, that in 
EN 1.13 Aristotle divides the human soul into rational and non-rational aspects, and 
claims that the non-rational aspectin particular, its ‘desiring element’ 5must 
‘obey’ (peitharchei) reason so as to desire good ends.6 In EN 6.13, the philosopher 
adds that a person can be ‘good in the strict sense (agathos haplos)’7 if and only if he 
has the intellectual virtue of phronesis, which, as he states in EN 6.9, has access to the 
‘the true conception’ of end. 8 These Aristotle’s statements, which seem to signal that 
moral virtue involves reason, and that the rational aspect must play a part in value 
                                                             
2
 The earliest known rationalist interpreter of Aristotle is a 2
nd
-century commentator Aspasius (see fn. 
12 below), who is also the earliest known commentator of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. A recent 
version of the rationalist interpretation can be found e.g. in Irwin 2007, pp. 158–97.  
3
 I discuss Moss 2011 and 2012 in this paper. She has since revised her interpretation (2014a), but the 
main objection that I present in this paper applies even to this revised version (see fn. 91 below).  
4
 This interpretation probably comes from Walter 1874, and was later expanded in Zeller 1894. 
5
 EN 1.13 1102b30 (R). Translated by Ross 1995. In the subsequent footnotes, Ross is abbreviated as 
(R) and another translation of EN that I use, Bartlett and Collins 2009, as (B&C). If the translation is 
my own, there is no abbreviation. Whether I quote from (R) or (B&C) or use my own translation is 
determined by the accuracy and readability of either translation.  
6
 EN 1.13 1102b26. 
7
 EN 6.13 1144b30 (R).  
8
 EN  1142b33. For more discussion about Aristotle’s statement, see fn. 22 below.  
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 cognition, have rendered the traditional anti-rationalist readings of EN 2.4, 3.3 and the 
selected passages of EN 6 and 7 to seem incoherent to many interpreters.  
 Moss has, however, challenged the widely endorsed assumption that returning the 
ancient rationalist line of interpretation is the most plausible alternative to the 
incoherent anti-rationalist interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of value cognition. 
Instead, she has suggested a novel version of the anti-rationalist interpretation, by 
arguing, on the basis of certain passages of DA 3, that insofar as representing the ends 
for desire is the task of phantasia, or, imaginationand since phantasia cognises 
those ends non-rationally, by imagining (phantazein) them as pleasant on the basis of 
one’s past pleasurable experiences about reaching certain endsthe discernment of 
good ends does not presuppose reason.
9
 Habituation to realise good ends, so that one 
comes to enjoy from only imagining realising such ends, suffices for discerning which 
ends of desire are good. In value cognition, the task of the rational aspect of soul 
might only be to conceptualise pleasurable mental images (phantasmata) of ends: to 
label them as ‘good’ so as to enable us to use them in moral deliberation.  
 I will study Moss’ challenge in the second part of the paper, concentrating on her 
interpretation about phantasia as exclusively non-rational ability to cognise good 
ends, and on how that interpretation relates to the received interpretation of phantasia, 
according to which it is a capacity that entirely belongs neither to the rational nor to 
the non-rational aspect of the soul. In the third part, I will attempt to show a way for 
the rationalist line of interpretation to address her arguments. I believe Moss 
overlooks some serious problems to which her interpretation is susceptible, but which 
the rationalist interpretation can avoid, while, however, also providing us with a tried 
and tested account of Aristotle’s theory of value cognition. 
   
1.1 Rationalist Interpretation  
 
Aristotle states that our desires are aimed at two types of ends: ‘[s]ome (ends) 
are activities (energeiai) others products apart from the activities that produce 
them’.10 Only the former types can be said to be good without introducing any further 
                                                             
9
 See section 1.2 below for references to Moss 2011 and 2012.  
10
 EN 1.1 1094a3–4 (R). 
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 qualifications, because ‘where there are ends apart from actions (praxeis), it is the 
nature of the product to be better than the activities.’11 For the activities undertaken 
only in order to gain a certain product (e.g. a flute, pleasure, money or honour) can be 
good only insofar as they help in bringing about that product, whereas only an 
activity, or, action (praxis) undertaken (also) for its own sake can be good as such. 
Since Aristotle also thinks that people do not need to use reason to pursue pleasure, at 
leastfor non-rational animals can have this pursuit, too12we do not need to ask if 
discerning the latter types of ends must involve the rational part of soul. However, the 
question becomes pertinent with the former types, as Aristotle nowhere explicitly 
states if it is needed in discerning an end as unqualifiedly good (agathos haplos). 
       According to the rationalist interpretation, the philosopher’s position is, however, 
that discerning ends as unqualifiedly goodhenceforth simply ‘good ends’must 
require reason. This interpretation has ancient origins: for example, the earliest known 
commentator to EN, Aspasius, endorses it.
13
 The interpretation begins from EN 1.13, 
in which Aristotle claims that human soul is divisible into two aspects, rational and 
non-rational: ‘one aspect of [soul] is non-rational (alogon), another has reason 
(logos)’ and ‘reason […] exhorts [people] towards the best’.14 If the rational aspect 
desires on the basis of cognising valuediscerning what is the bestthen the non-
rational aspect may not, and this can constitute the difference between the two 
aspects. The non-rational aspect is further divisible into purely vegetative pursuits and 
the desire that can be affected by the value cognition of the rational aspect.
15
 The 
desire that can be so affected (epithumia)which I will simply call ‘non-rational 
                                                             
11
 Ibid. 4-5 (R). 
12
 See e.g. EN 1.4 1095b13–20. 
13
 See e.g. Aspasius, Comm. 40:5-15 (ad EN 2.2 1103b31-1104b3) for an explicit endorsement: even 
with virtuous people, it is the task of reason to say ‘that this must be done and that this must not be 
done’ and to justify why (alluding to Aristotle’s distinction between to hoti and dioti in EN 1.4). 
Aspasius comments to EN 1.13 (36:1-5) that in virtuous people, “the desiring and emotive part is said 
to partake in reason in that it ‘is heeding of it’ (cit. EN 1.13 1102b31), just as we also say that we take 
a certain account of our father.” According to Aspasius’ interpretation, we thus seem to require input of 
the rational part to discern good actions, to justify them, and even to be motivated to perform them.   
14
 EN 1.13 1102a27–b18. 
15
 Aristotle writes in EN 1.13 1102a31–1102b12 that we have non-rational vegetative desires of 
nutrition and growth that ‘are mostly displayed in sleep’ (i.e. that cannot be affected by value 
cognition) and do not differ between good and bad people. Therefore Aristotle concludes that we 
should ‘let them be’ while discussing virtue. Aristotle distinguishes them the desires that are non-
rational, but which can be affected by reason (logos) in 1102b13-14. 
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 desire’ from now onhas to characteristically do ‘with what is pleasant or painful’, 
as Aristotle specifies in EN 3.2, ‘unlike choice of good action (prohairesis)’ that 
results from the desire of the rational aspect (boulesis).
16
 As the cognition of value is 
thus not about pleasure, and non-rational desire is concerned especially with pleasure, 
it seems that good ends cannot be discerned without the activity of the rational aspect. 
Aristotle adds to this, in EN 1.13, that although the desire of the non-rational aspect 
can be guided by the rational aspect, it nevertheless tends to ‘strain against’ the 
dictates of the rational aspect.
17
 Hence he must also hold that we can desire an end 
that we discern as good with our rational abilities independently of whether we 
anticipate that pursuing will be pleasant or not. 
       If this interpretation is right, Aristotle’s division of human desires on the basis of 
their endsexcluding those desires that are only for the products of actions and the 
vegetative desires that bear no relation to value cognitionturns out to be as follows: 
Rational desire (boulesis): Desiring to phi by discerning the goodness of phi-ing;  
Non-rational desire (epithumia): Desiring to phi by anticipating (typically) the pleasure of 
phi-ing (there are probably also some other non-rational ends apart from pleasure, but 
Aristotle does not openly speak of them in EN 1.13, because for him, the desire of sensual 
pleasure is the principal opponent of rational desire
18
).  
 Although Aristotle thinks that, provided that phi-ing is good, it should also feel 
pleasant,
19
 he also concedes that the two above desires are often directed to different 
ends. As he argues in EN 1.7 and 10.7, the best human end (to telos), the completion 
of which achieving any other good end (such as receiving rightful honours, just 
financial rewards, proper pleasures or constructing good flutes) advances, is the life of 
acting well in which contemplation has a central role, or, eudaimonia.
20
 Because the 
best end towards which reason exhorts us is thus highly abstract, pursuing it may not 
feel immediately pleasant, unlike the pursuit of some other ends, such as those of 
                                                             
16
 EN 3.2 1111b17.  
17
 EN 1.13 1102b21.  
18
 Cf. EN 2.9 1109b7-8, in which Aristotle states we are the most inclined to go into excesses with 
regard to pleasure, and thus we should primarily guard ourselves against inappropriate pleasures. 
19
 EN 10.5 1175a29 (B&C): ‘[F]or the pleasure proper to the activity helps increase it: those who 
engage in an activity with pleasure judge each particular better and are more precise about it. For 
example, those who delight in practicing geometry become skilled geometers […] and each of the rest 
will advance in their respective work because they delight in it’. Aristotle continues by arguing that 
enjoying good activities also makes those activities more permanent and better overall. 
20
 See EN 1.7 1098a13–1 and 10.7.  
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 eating or drinking, which may not, however, help in realising eudaimonia, provided 
that they are excessive (or sometimes defective, see Aristotle’s famous doctrine of 
mean in EN 2.6). The conflict between the immediate pleasure of excesses and ends 
that bring us closer to eudaimonia is the source of our non-rational desire often 
straining against the rational one. Habituation to enjoy pursuing ends that advance 
eudaimonia should make acting well feel more and more immediately pleasant, 
eventually surpassing all excessive pleasures.
21
 However, only habituation does not 
suffice for virtue. In EN 6.13, Aristotle concludes that for this, also reason is needed: 
Virtue is not only a characteristic that is in accord with right reason (kata ton orthon logon), but also 
the one that involves the right reason (meta tou orthou logou). […] It is clear, then, on the basis of what 
has been said, that it is neither possible to be properly virtuous (kyrios agathos) without practical 
reason (phronesis), nor it is possible to have phronesis without the moral virtue.
22
 
   Because proper virtue (kyria arête) is acting that is not only in accordance with, 
but also involves the right reason (orthos logos), acquiring it is not only a matter of 
habituation to enjoy acting wellfor example, abstaining from eating or drinking too 
muchuntil one immediately begins to enjoy this way of acting. This would be 
acting only in accordance with the right reason. Rather, proper virtue is acting well, 
because such acting brings about eudaimonia, not only insofar it would bring about 
pleasure.
23
 In order to act from the right reason, one needs, as Aristotle reminds in EN 
6, to develop the intellectual virtue of phronesis, which has cognitive access to this 
‘true conception of end’,24 and commands us to act on the basis of it.25 The same 
                                                             
21
 See e.g. EN 2.3 1104b3–13 (R): ‘[…] virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of 
the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from good ones. Hence 
we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as to both 
delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought, this is the right education’. Similar statements 
can be found in, e.g., EN 3.12 1119b13ff and EN 10.9 1179a26–31. 
22
 EN 6.13 1144b25–32. 
23
 See EN 2.4 1105a29–b5 and EN 4.1 1120a23–4, in which Aristotle says that a virtuous person 
performs good actions because they are kala, or, noble. Since he also thinks that the human good 
consists in acting wellin EN 1.4 1095a19–20it is generally accepted (and argued more extensively 
for by, e.g., Achtenberg 2002, pp. 8–9, and Irwin 2007, p. 207) that to kalon refers to the human good 
in this context. Aristotle also identifies the human good with the ‘noblest thing’ in EN 1.8 1099a24.  
24
 In EN 1142b30-33, Aristotle writes: ‘if then, it is characteristic of phronimoi to have deliberated 
well, good deliberation (euboulia) will be correctness with regard to the means (pros) to the end (to 
telos), of which phronesis is the true conception (hypolepsis).’ The grammar of this passage permits 
that phronesis could be a true conception of either (1) ‘the end’ or (2) ‘the means to the end,’ It may 
seem that option (1) would allow us to make the passage to cohere with Aristotle’s specification in EN 
6.12 that phronesis is concerned with good ends, unlike cleverness (deinotes), which is only concerned 
with the means to various ends. The interpretative option (2) might thus seem conflate phronesis with 
deinotes. I think, however, that we should not adopt the option (1) to avoid the conflation, because 
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 requirement is visible in the conclusion of EN 6.13 that one does not have phronesis 
unless one is properly virtuousacts kata ton orthon logonand vice versa. 
 The above lessons drawn from EN 1.13 and 6.13 seem to imply that one cannot 
learn to pursue the that are good without qualification by habituation only, or without 
discerning that those ends are goodwhich requires phronesis. Many recent 
rationalist interpreterse.g. John Cooper, Norman Dahl and Terence Irwin26have 
given their support for this interpretation on the basis of these conclusions. The anti-
rationalist interpretation, introduced in the 19
th
 century as an alternative to this ancient 
line, first by Julius Walter and then in an expanded form by Eduard Zeller,
27
 has 
proved to be less enduring; as far as I know, no recent interpreter had endorsed it until 
Moss. The anti-rationalist interpretation, as presented by these scholars, is centred in 
EN 2.4, 3.3 and some passages in EN 6 and 7, which may indeed seem to present 
Aristotle as thinking that discerning good ends does not have to involve the rational 
aspect of soul. Let me quote those passages and show how an anti-rationalist reads 
them, and then how the rationalist interpreters could address these readings.  
 In EN 2.4, Aristotle, after remarking that acting well is not yet proper virtue, 
because we only become virtuous by acting well, lists the additional conditions of 
being a virtuous person. Someone is virtuous only if he, in addition to acting well: 
First, acts knowingly (proton men ean eidos), second, if he acts by choosing and by choosing the 
actions in question for themselves; and third, if he acts while being in a steady and unwavering state. 
But, when it comes to virtues, knowledge (eidos) has no, or little, force, whereas the other two 
conditions amount to not a small part of but rather the whole affairthe conditions that are in fact met 
as a result of doing just and temperate things many times.
28
  
 If acting knowingly is unimportant for moral virtue, as Aristotle seems to say 
above, and if we become virtuous only through habituation, by coming to enjoy acting 
                                                                                                                                                                              
there are also passages in EN 6 that preclude phronesis from grasping the end (EN 6.12 1144a7-9 and 
EN 6.13 1145a5-7, quoted on p. 9 below). Since in order to select the correct means to the end, 
phronesis has, however, to be nevertheless aware of the end, some faculty other than it has to provide it 
with the correct conception of the end (see Natali 2014, p. 196). The interpretative option (2) allows 
this, and can be specified to avoid conflating phronesis with deinotes. If only phronesis has cognitive 
access to the true conception of the end, only it enables one to deliberate well about how to bring about 
eudaimonia. Deinotes can be correct deliberation about how to realise ends other than eudaimonia. 
25
 In EN 6.13 1144b28, Aristotle identifies phronesis with the right reason (orthos logos) and in EN 
6.10 1143a8–9, the philosopher tells us that phronesis issues commands (epitaktikon estin). 
26
 Cooper 1975, Dahl 1984, Irwin 2007. 
27
 Walter 1874, Zeller 1896. 
28
 EN 2.4 1105a29–b5 (B & C, ‘moderate’ replaced with ‘temperate’). 
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 well, then it may seem that discerning good ends does not require having any 
conception of end, the acquisition of whichat least the correct onepresupposes 
reason. 
 This passage in EN 3.3 may seem to reinforce this anti-rationalist interpretation:  
We deliberate not about ends but about the things towards (pros) ends (tele). For a doctor does not 
deliberate (boulein) whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman 
whether he shall produce law and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his end. They put in 
place the end (themenoi to telos) and consider how and by what things the end is to be attained.
29
  
 In above passage, Aristotle claims that just as doctors do not deliberate whether to 
heal or not, so it could be that we do not deliberate (boulein) about whether to pursue 
some good end or not, but we put our ends in proper places in some other way. The 
following passages in EN 6 and 7 clarify that it is neither phronesis nor even logos, 
but moral virtue that correctly discerns which potential ends of desire would be good: 
Virtue makes the end correct, phronesis the means to the end.
30
  
Choice is not right without either phronesis or virtue: for the one makes us [to have] the [correct] end, 
and the other [to have] the [correct] means to it. 
31
 
It is not that reason (logos) teaches about (didaskalikos) the starting-points, but either natural or 
habituated virtue teaches the right belief (tou orthodoxein) about the starting-point.
32
  
 The anti-rationalist interpreters have traditionally taken the above claims of EN 
3.3, 6 and EE to imply together that habituated or natural virtue, instead of the rational 
aspect of soul, puts in place our ends, and at most we can use our phronesis to 
deliberate how to realise them. As Zeller famously concludes, ‘the natural basis of 
insight [phronesis] is the intellectual acuteness that enables us to find and apply 
proper means to a given end.’33 Hence it may seem that we do not need the activity of 
the rational aspect to discern good ends, but only to calculate how to realise them.  
 The problem with this interpretation, however, is that we have seen Aristotle to 
argue in EN 6.13 that proper virtue must involve phronesis and none of the above 
passages have to be read as contradicting this rationalist argument. EN 2.4 only denies 
the importance of one’s knowledge being eidos, or, form, for moral virtue. Our 
                                                             
29
 EN 3.3 1112b12–16. 
30
 EN 6.12 1144a7-9. 
31
 EN 6.13 1145a5-7. 
32
 EN 7.8 1151a17-19. 
33
 Zeller 1894, p. 186.  
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 rational discernment of good ends would not, however, involve eidos in any case, 
because, as Aristotle explains in EN 1.6, that (even) things that are good in themselves 
(e.g. ‘phronesis, sight, certain pleasures and honour’) do not seem to have any 
common eidos that could account for their goodness.
34
 Likewise, EN 3.3 claims only 
that we do not deliberate (buolein) whether to pursue a certain end or nota view 
with which many rationalist interpreters agree
35for Aristotle’s words, which leave 
open what puts our ends in place, does not preclude the rational aspect of our souls 
from discerning (krinein) good ends.
 
Neither do the passages in EN 6, for rational 
krisis may not need to require using phronesis, or, be an act of deliberation, on the 
contrary, Aristotle speaks of it in DA as if krisis were analogous to visual perception 
instead.
36
 Furthermore, with regard to the passage of EN 7.8, Aristotle claims in EN 
6.11 that ‘[what discerns] both the first principles and the last things [in deliberation] 
is nous not logos.’ 37  Now, if our intuitive reason, nous, discerns the ends of 
deliberation instead of logos, the inferential part of our reason,
38
 discerning good ends 
must nevertheless require the activity of the rational aspect of soul. 
 We can therefore see that the passages that may initially seem to support the anti-
rationalist interpreters can be compatible with the rationalist line of interpretation. 
Since the former interpretation seems, however, unable to accommodate those of 
Aristotle’s passages, in EN 1.13 and 6.13, that clearly seem to imply that discerning 
the good ends of desires require reason, the rationalist interpretation prevails today. 
 
1.2 Moss’ anti-rationalist challenge  
 
  In her 2012 book, Aristotle and the Apparent Good, and in a paper published 
in 2011, Jessica Moss has, however, challenged the conclusion that Aristotle must be 
rationalist on account of his views in EN 1.13 and 6.13. She suggests that Aristotle 
                                                             
34
 EN 1.6 1096b16-26. Aristotle uses the concepts of eidos and idea interchangeably in this passage. 
35
 See e.g. Bowditch 2008, pp. 326–336 and Reeve 2013, p. 11. 
36
 See DA 3.3 427a19–22, the passage is quoted on p. 15 below. 
37
 EN 6.11 I143a35-1143b1. 
38
 For Aristotle, reasons for action are matters of logos, e.g, orthos logos, just as argumentation and 
speech. Cf. Moss 2014b, which even proposes that logos should be translated as ‘explanatory account.’ 
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 might only mean that reason is necessary for the pursuit of good endsat least 
concepts, the use and formation of which requires reason, ‘help us determine the 
contents of our perceptions’but nevertheless think that moral virtue does not 
presuppose the use of reason in discerning good ends as such.
39
 According to Moss, 
Aristotle can think that ‘we want our ends, because we find them good,’ but this does 
not have to mean that they are ‘what we rationally judge good.’40 So far, the anti-
rationalist interpretation, which did not recognise that these two views could be 
separated, that discerning a good end could be non-rational, while determining that 
the end is good require reason, has simply not looked for evidence in the right places. 
Moss thinks that evidence for Aristotle’s anti-rationalism is to be found especially in 
DA 3, in which the philosopher discusses phantasia, often translated as imagination.  
 Until now, most interpreters of Aristotle’s theory of moral cognition seem to have 
regarded phantasia as a cognitive capacity that cannot be classified as being entirely 
either rational or non-rational.
41
 According to current mainstream interpretation, one 
task of phantasia is to enable us to imagine the ends of desire, which is necessary for 
any kind of desiring. For in order to desire anything, we have to be able to imagine 
what would the realising the end of our desire be like: honourable, pleasant etc.
42
 
Aristotle thus writes in DMA: ‘phantasia suitably prepares desire; and phantasia 
arises through nous or through perception (aesthesis).’43 Now, imagining an end of 
desire (phantasma), call it x, the mainstream interpretation takes the philosopher’s 
statement to tell, requires either only perception (e.g. smelling a pleasant smell, seeing 
x emitting it), and at some other times also nous (e.g. discerning x as the best end to 
pursue among many possibilities). The discernment of good ends presupposes the 
                                                             
39
 Moss 2012, p. 40. Moss does not clarify here what ‘determination’ of the contents of perception 
involves. As we see on pp. 15-16 below, she must, however, mean determining our perceptions with 
certain concepts – making it conceptually explicit that ‘what I see is a good end (or ‘rose’ as on p. 16).’ 
40
 Moss 2012, p. 158. 
41
 Aristotle may seem to claim so in DA 3.9 432a27-b1: ‘we shall find parts [of soul] […] which cannot 
be classified as either rational or irrational […] (such as) the imaginative […]. However, he also adds 
(b2) ‘it is very difficult to say with which of the other [parts of soul] it is the same or not the same’, so 
his claim is not decisive. In the same context, he also says that bipartite division of soul is insufficient 
to describe the soul, because there are (a24) “in a sense infinity of parts.” Cf. EN 1.13 (see section 1.1 
above), in which Aristotle seems, however, to agree with the bipartite division. 
42
 E.g. Caston 1996, p. 42, Lorenz 2009, pp. 119–22 and Polansky 2007  ad loc. DA 3.9 428b10–429a9, 
in which Aristotle defines phantasia as that which enables motion on the basis of perception. 
43
 DMA 702a18–19. 
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 rational aspect of soul not only according to the passage of EN 6.11, quoted on p. 10 
above. Also in DA 3.11, Aristotle writes that rational (logistike) phantasia is 
necessary for this purpose, precisely for ‘measuring by one standard, for one pursues 
the superior [of various possible ends],’ and because such a measuring is needed ‘so 
that [we] are able to pick one [phantasma] from many possible phantasmata,’ 44 
While perceptual (aisthetike) phantasia belongs to all animals capable of moving 
themselves on the basis of sense perception,
45
 the rational phantasia belongs 
exclusively to humans, for only their souls have rational aspect. Since human 
phantasia can thus involve either only sense perception or also the activity of the 
rational aspect of their souls, it cannot be exclusively classified, according to the 
mainstream interpretation, as entirely either non-rational or rational faculty.  
       Moss thinks, however, that there is an alternative to this interpretation. She points 
out that Aristotle states, for example, in EN 3.4, ‘without qualification and in truth the 
object of [rational desire] is the good, but for each person it is the apparent good.’46 
As Aristotle seems to contrast here the object of rational desire with the apparent 
good, the apparent good (to phainomenon agathon) must refer the object of our 
perceptual, non-rational phantasia. Hence his statement may imply that everyone 
desires what she non-rationally perceives as good.
47
 In EE 7.2, Aristotle, Moss points 
out, elaborates his view and explains how we can non-rationally perceive good ends: 
The object of desire is either the good or the apparent good. And this is why the pleasant is an object of 
desire, for it is an apparent good, for some believe it is [good] and for some it appears [good] although 
they do not believe so. For phantasia and belief are not in the same part of the soul.
48
  
       Provided that everyone desires what appears to them as good, the first sentence of 
this passage cannot mean (pace the rationalist interpreters) that we can sometimes 
desire only the true good, regardless of what our phantasia represents as good. Rather, 
                                                             
44
 DA 3.11 434a7–10. The passage is also quoted by Lorenz 2009, p. 122, to establish a similar point. 
His translations is that rational phantasia occurs ‘in animals capable of reasoning: for the decision 
whether to do this or that is already a task for reasoning; and one must measure by a single standard; 
for one pursues what is superior; hence one has the ability to make one out of many phantasmata.’ 
45
 See for example DA 3.10 433b27-30 and 433b31-434a4, DA 2.2 413b21-3 cf. DA 3.10 428a10ff, in 
which Aristotle states, however, that ‘ants, bees or grubs’ do not have phantasia. 
46
 EN 3.4 1113a23-4, also MA 700b23-9. Quoted by Moss 2012 on p. 4. 
47
 Moss 2012, p. 4.  
48
 EE 7.2 1235b26-29. Quoted by Moss 2012, on p. xi, 6, 8, 30, 36 fn. 2 and 48. Since this passage is 
from EE, and there seems to be no corresponding views presented in EN, one may reasonably doubt, 
however, whether the passage presents Aristotle’s final view about the issue. 
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 it must only mean, as Moss argues, that apparent goodthe end of our non-rational 
desireeither or not corresponds with what we rationally discern to be a good end.49 
The second sentence of the passage adds pleasure is the end of our non-rational 
desire. Therefore pleasure is the apparent good.
50
 If something is not pleasant for us, it 
cannot appear as good for us, although we do not of course believe that everything 
that may appear as pleasant for us is good.
51
 Aristotle concludes the passage by 
stating that this disparity between belief and phantasia about the good is due to 
phantasia and belief residing not in the same part of human soul. Although Aristotle 
discusses also rational phantasia in DA 3.10, this discussionsince we have seen that 
all desire is based on perceptual phantasiasuggests Moss, can be only a description 
for certain ‘use which rational creatures can put the products of perceptual phantasia’, 
that is, referring to non-rational appearances in deliberation.
52
  
 Phantasia may seem, however, not only separate from the rational aspect of soul, 
but also opposed to it, just like the non-rational aspect is.
53
 For example, according to 
DA 3.10 ‘[m]any men their phantasia contrary to their knowledge, and in all other 
animals there is no thinking (nous) or calculation but only (alla) phantasia’54 On 
Moss’ view, instead of being outside the division of the aspects of soul, as we have 
seen the mainstream interpretation to claim, this passage shows that phantasia and 
reason are ‘mutually exclusive.’55 She also concludes that phantasia must be within 
the non-rational aspect of soul.
56
 Moss’ conclusion might seem right in the light of the 
                                                             
49
 Moss 2012, p. ix. Cf. DA 3.10 433a27: ‘the object [of our non-rational desire] may be either the real 
or apparent good.’ Since non-rational desire is incapable of desiring the real good (eudaimonia) as 
such, this passage may be taken to signal, in favour of Moss, that Aristotle wants to establish only 
correspondence, that the real good can correspond with what appears good for our non-rational desire.  
50
 Ibid., p. 30 and 36 fn. 2. 
51
 See Moss 2012, pp. 106-112, in which Moss discusses illusionary phantasmata. 
52
 Moss 2012, p. 146. 
53
 Cf. EN 1.13 1102b21. 
54
 DA 3.10 433a10-12. As quoted by Moss 2012 on p. 16 and 138. 
55
 According to Moss 2012, p. 138, DA 3.10 433a10-12 shows that ‘phantasia and intellect’ are 
‘mutually exclusive’. On p. 16, Moss argues the quoted passage (together with DA 3.10 4333a9 and 
b11) to show in addition that ‘desire moves [one to act] with the aid either of intellect or phantasia’ and 
‘phantasia plays role roughly parallel to that of intellect’ in motivating action.  
56
 See Moss 2012, pp. 64-6. For a more condensed and explicit account, see Moss 2011, p. 252. 
Although DA 3.10 433a10-12, as interpreted by Moss 2012 (see fn. 54 above), could have justified this 
claim, Moss 2011 does not cite it. Instead, she claims (p. 252, in fn.) that ‘for an outright equation of 
the ethical works’ non-rational passionate part with the perceptive and phantastic part of the 
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 previous quotation: if phantasia were outside Aristotle’s division of soul, then the 
philosopher would not have presumably described phantasia as if it were opposed to 
the rational aspect of soul, able to stimulate people to act against their knowledge. 
Provided that we thus take phantasia to belong to non-rational aspect of soul, as Moss 
advices, and since phantasia represents the ends of desires, then the ends of even our 
rational desires, good ends, would be perceived by the non-rational aspect of our soul, 
not by a faculty that is outside Aristotle’s bipartite division of soul.57  
 The apparently anti-rationalist passage of EN 3.3, claiming that we do not 
deliberate about our ends, and the passages of EN 6 and 7.8 that also preclude 
phronesis from setting them, support this conclusion. The conclusion would permit 
that good actions do not need to be performed in the knowledge (eidos) of their end, 
as Aristotle states in EN 2.4, for that end would now be a non-rational representation. 
Moss attempts, however, to show that apart from these passages traditionally cited by 
anti-rationalists, her interpretation, unlike the previous anti-rationalist interpretations, 
enables us to read also EN 1.13 and 6.13 anti-rationalistically, thus making the anti-
rationalist interpretation an overall plausible alternative to the rationalist one.  
 Before we can proceed to assessing Moss’ alternative readings of those passages, 
we need to clarify, however, what she thinks moral discernment (krisis) is. Moss 
argues that we perceive good ends through pleasant sensationswe do not discern 
thembut we cannot simply perceive which potential pleasure-inducing phantasma 
is ‘the superior [of various pursuable ends], because that task requires picking out one 
perception from many, discerning it. In received interpretative use, choosing the end 
that one should pursue means bringing particular discernments under the general 
concept of goodbuilding practical syllogisms such as in EN 7.3: ‘dry foods are good 
for men’; ‘I am a man’; ‘this food is dry’; therefore ‘this food is good for me’. Moss 
proposes, however, that although we of course can build syllogisms to discern good 
                                                                                                                                                                              
psychological works see EE 2.1 1219b23.’ However, unlike DA 3.10 433a9-12, this passage does not 
clearly equate the non-rational part and phantasia: ‘for in sleep the vegetative part is more active, while 
the perceptive and appetitive are incomplete.’ For Aristotle does not say that ‘the perceptive’ and 
‘appetitive’ are the same part, but speaks of them in plural, thus possibly denoting different parts.  
57
 Cf. DA 3.11 434a8–10 quoted on p. 12 above. The passage does not, however, have to contradict 
Moss’ claim, because in it Aristotle does not exactly argue that ‘discerning one from many 
phantasmata’ could not be entirely motivated by non-rational phantasia, e.g. by receiving a supremely 
intense pleasure from focusing on just one particular phantasma among various phantasmata. 
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 ends on the basis of our value perceptions, we do not have to do so,
58
 because non-
rational phantasia, if it were only properly habituated, could receive perceptions in a 
way that already entails discerning of their value in relation to one another.
 59
   
 In the beginning of her 2012 bookbefore presenting her above proposal about 
the power of habituation to enhance the perception (aisthesis) of good ends into the 
discernment (krisis) of the most valuable available endMoss focuses on Aristotle’s 
statement in DA 3.3 that ‘thinking (noein) and understanding (phronein) seem to be 
just like having a perception (aesthesis) of something, for in both cases the soul 
discerns (krinein) and recognizes something of the things that are’.60 Moss takes this 
brief statement to announce that, since even perceptions, which do not presuppose 
reason, because even non-rational animals have them, can be discernments (kriseis), 
discernments can be non-rational. ’There is’, states Moss, ‘nothing specially rational 
or intellectual about [krisis]: even a simple animal who lacks any mental powers more 
sophisticated than sense of touch counts as [discerner].’61 Or, as Moss put the same 
point in her 2011 article, since focusing on certain perceptions such as sensations of 
touch ‘is ‘available to animals as well as to people,’ making even discernments must 
also be available ‘to the non-rational part of human soul’.62 Aristotle may seem to 
validate Moss’ views in DMA, in which he briefly remarks ‘both phantasia and 
perception (aesthesis) hold the same place as nous, for all are kritika’.63 Non-rational 
animals cannot of course learn concepts, which limits their discernments to the 
sources of certain sensations; but once we have learned a concept, for example, ‘rose’, 
Moss assumes, we can discern objects that cause certain familiar sensual perceptions 
for us (i.e. have certain shape, smell and colour) also as roses without each time 
conceptually determining that each such object is a rose.
64
  
 If we can discern, for example, roses on the basis of our memorized perceptions, 
without having the relevant concept always in mind, phantasia might equally allow 
                                                             
58
 For this particular claim, see Moss 2009, pp. 145–6. 
59
 Moss 2012, p. 21.  
60
 DA 3.3 427a19–22. As quoted by Moss 2012 on p. 3. Cf. 432a16 and DMA 700b17–20. 
61
 Moss 2012, p. 3. 
62
 Moss 2011, p. 252.  
63
 DMA 700b20-21. As quoted by Moss 2012 on p. 10. 
64
 Moss 2012, p. 40.  
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 discerning an end that cause certain familiar perceptions as good without necessarly 
attending to the concept of good, and hence without ‘thinking or understanding,’ i.e. 
the activity of the rational aspect of soul, being required for the task. Moss points out 
that, in the already quoted passage of DA 3.11, Aristotle states that humans are ‘able 
to pick one [phantasma] from many possible phantasmata.’ According to her, this 
implies that phantasia enables us to ‘synthesise a single image which represents one 
option as overall best’ from the various perceptions that we have memorised.65  
 Even if we could discern what is the ‘overall best’ with phantasia, considering 
value discernment as analogous to discerning roses, or any animal discernment, and 
therefore non-rational, would need, however, a further justification. While many 
animals can discern the sources of sensuous pleasure, and virtually every person with 
a healthy sense of sight and memory can discern roses, this is not the case with good 
ends. Discerning those ends, Aristotle says in EN 2.8, is ‘not for everyone nor it is 
easy.’66 According to EN 3.4, ‘a (morally) virtuous person discerns each thing (i.e. 
good end) rightly, and in each case the truth appears to (phainetai) him.’ Apparently, 
only a virtuous person discerns them rightly, ‘for distinctive things’, the philosopher 
continues, ‘are noble (kala) and pleasant according to (kata) each disposition.’67  
 Aristotle’s above conclusions may encourage a rationalist interpreter to argue that 
learning to discern good ends is ‘not for everyone’, because it must require some 
intellectual education, even if many other kinds of discernments would not. Moss can 
justify, however, her interpretation against such an argument. If the accuracy of 
discerning an end as good depends upon the sensations of pleasure that imagining 
(phantazein) it gives to a virtuous person, then most people could not reliably discern 
good ends on their own even if they had learned what is good for humans. Non-
virtuous people’s phantasia, as DA 3.10 tells us, is prone to mistakes, probably, 
because they only have not been habituated to enjoy performing the actions that 
contribute to the human good. ‘The road [to unqualifiedly good ends]’, writes 
                                                             
65
 Ibid. p. 148 Moss does not unfortunately explain how this process takes place.  
66
 EN 2.8 1109a28-9. 
67
 EN 3.4 1113a29–32. Moss (2011) presents her interpretation of the passage on p. 25: ‘If the virtuous 
person’s ability to perceive facts about value [moral cognition] is a matter of being pleased and pained 
in the right ways, or admiring and being disgusted by the right things [as the passage says], then this 
perception [moral cognition] is an operation of non-rational cognition’. Her 2012 book lists several 
additional passages in favour of this conclusion (pp.160-1), but this passage is her main support. 
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 Aristotle in EE 7.2, is ‘through pleasure: it is necessary for fine (kala) things to be 
pleasant.’68 In EN, he confirms this, argues Moss, for example, by writing that ‘the 
whole affair both in virtue and in the political art is about pleasures (hedone) and 
pains.’69 In these passages, Aristotle, according to Moss, does not claim as if coming 
to enjoy acting well would only help one in achieving moral virtue together with 
intellectual educationas a rationalist interpreter might like to saybut rather as if it 
would suffice for the task.
70
 Habituation gets us to associate acting well with 
experiences of pleasure, the memorising of which allows us imagine the pleasure 
ensuing from a certain virtuous action, having a pleasurable phantasma about a good 
end. And having such a phantasma, we have seen Moss to argue, is discerning the end 
as good. The rational aspect of soul has no role to play in value cognition. 
 Moss’ interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of value cognition thus implies that one 
can become able to discern which ends are good through only being habituated to 
enjoy acting well. If imagining a certain action produces pleasure to a well-habituated, 
i.e., virtuous, person, then that action must be a good end. Since her interpretation, 
thinks Moss, holds true with any good action, we can now attempt test it with the kind 
of action that one could think as the most obvious counterexample to it: a heroically 
courageous action. According to Moss’ conception, even a heroic warrior, thanks to 
his habituated character, can discern that fighting until death in a battle is a good end 
only by having sensations of pleasure while imagining such a heroic death. Since 
acting well can often be physically painfulextremely so in this casethe pleasure 
that a virtuous warrior derives from imagining it relies on the synthesising ability of 
his phantasia to pick one possible course of action as the ‘best’ among the perceptions 
that he has memorised. Even if also non-virtuous warrior could somehow imagine that 
a heroic death may, for example, contribute to the future eudaimonia of her polis and 
is thus the best course of action available etc.,
71
 this awarenesssince he is not 
habituated to derive sufficient pleasure from acting well, and thus from imagining 
                                                             
68
 EE 7.2 1237a6-7, as quoted by Moss 2012 on p. 202. 
69
 EN 2.3 115a10-12, as quoted in ibid.   
70
 Ibid. However, the passages do not have to be read as making such a claim. They can also be read as 
only rhetorically stressing (for they employ rhetorical language) that learning to derive pleasure from 
acting well is essential for becoming virtuous, without excluding the need for rational development. 
71
 Kraut 1990, p. 122, thinks this is Aristotle’s justification for the virtuousness of a heroic death.  
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 herself engaged in such acting in difficult situations neitherwould not suffice to 
drive her to prefer heroic death over running away.  
 Despite Moss’ interpretation seems to be able to provide a conceivable account of 
even heroically courageous acting, it might, however, still be difficult to conceive 
how perceiving an end as pleasant could be the same as discerning a good endor, 
even, how perceiving a certain shape and colour could be the same as discerning a 
rose etc. One might think there is a ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in any such an equation.72 
However, even if Aristotle did not consider it important to elucidate this matter any 
further, it would nevertheless be good news for anti-rationalist interpreters if the 
philosopher simply thought that good ends could be discerned non-rationally, as Moss 
reads him in DA 3. They could admit, as Moss does, that ‘[c]ertainly, Aristotle holds 
[…] that we want our ends because we find them good’,73 and specify that the non-
rational aspect of the soul, insofar as phantasia is non-rational, discerns their 
goodness in imagined pleasure. Hence they could hold that discerning good ends does 
not require the activity of the rational aspect of soul, provided that they could, 
however, also plausibly deal with EN 1.13 and 6.13the textual basis for the opposite 
rationalist interpretationas Moss thinks her interpretation can.  
      Moss points out that all the earlier anti-rationalist interpreters assumed, just as 
contemporary rationalist interpreters assume, that Aristotle’s division of soul in EN 
1.13 is between our cognitive (i.e. actively discerning) and non-cognitive (i.e. only 
passively perceiving) capacities.
74
 But since Moss has argued that the non-rational 
aspect of soul includes a cognitive capabilityphantasiashe thinks that this 
hitherto unquestioned assumption must be revised: perhaps the only relevant 
difference between the aspects of soul is that the former discerns with concepts, the 
latter without.
75
 According to Moss’ suggested revision, the only task of reason in 
                                                             
72
 One may of course also think that there is naturalistic fallacyan equation of the good with natural 
features that cannot be shown to be synonymous to itin Aristotle’s thinking in any case: even if he 
would not equate pleasure with the good, he would nevertheless equate eudaimonia with it. However, 
unlike pleasure ((a state resulting from satisfying a desire or being in the state of satisfaction (EN 7.12 
1152b33-1153a7 and 7.14) accompanied by the heating of body (DMA 701b33-702a1)) eudaimonia 
evades a naturalistic definition: eudaimonia is acting well in which contemplation has a central role. 
73
 Moss 2012, p. 158. I have replaced the word ‘un-Humean’ with square brackets, since in this paper I 




 Moss 2012, pp. 223-4. 
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 value cognition would be to label our non-rational discernments of ends with moral 
concepts (such as ‘virtuous’, ‘advantageous’ or ‘shameful’) which does not modify 
their content or causal efficacy, but only enables us to use them as starting-points in 
moral reasoning.
76
 She presents the passage of EN 7.8 that we have already seen, to 
support her conclusion: ‘neither indeed in [mathematics] is the logos instructive of the 
starting-points nor in [the practical case], but virtue, either natural or habituated [is 
instructive] of the right belief about the starting-point.’77 Moss thinks this passage 
tells that ‘our cognitions of the starting points of practical reasoning [i.e. of good 
ends] are rational, exercises of intellectbut their content derives from character, i.e. 
from the generalised phantasia that is produced through habituation.’ 78  Once a 
person’s phantasia has perceived an action as pleasant, which, as Moss thinks, is to 
discern it as good, ‘intellect steps in’ as she puts it in her 2011 article, ‘assenting and 
thereby conceptualizing the appearance […]. Now [the person] not only experiences 
an appearance of virtuous activity as the good, but also believes that it is so’.79  
         In the same article, Moss argues further that Aristotle’s claim regarding the 
necessity of acting with the involvement of right reason (orthos logos) for moral 
virtue in EN 6.13 does not have to imply, in light of her interpretation, that a virtuous 
person can articulate the right reason for his actingto act well, because such acting 
is goodwhich would require phronesis. Rather, the claim can imply, more 
modestly, that even if a person can have moral virtue as a result of non-rational 
habituation onlyas the anti-rationalist interpretation reads EN 2.4 to sayit is not 
only said to be proper virtue (kyria arête) unless he also consciously acts on the basis 
of the right reason. Moss explains her reading by means of the following analogue. 
Imagine two servants who act well. ‘The former acts on his own impulses; the latter 
takes the lead from his superior. And it would be reasonable enough, if somewhat odd 
to our ears, to say that only in the latter case is the servant truly (or strictly) an 
                                                             
76
 Ibid., pp. 227-228, quoting Tuozzo 1994 on p. 227: “the good and the desire ‘differ only in their 
mode of cognition: the one [good] is conceptualized, and so involves thought, while the other [the 
pleasant] is unconceptualized and so involves perception (or phantasia aisthetike)….’” 
77
 EN 7.8 1151a17-19, as quoted by Moss 2012 on p. 225.  
78
 Moss 2012, p. 225. 
79
 Moss 2011, p. 256. 
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 excellent one’.80 Proper (or strict) virtue might thus not be the same as moral virtue, 
as we have seen the rationalists read EN 6.13, but it could be moral virtue, for which 
the habituation of character and phantasma of good ends suffice, plus an ability to 
conceptualise the discernments of phantasia and articulate the right reason for action.  
 
1.3 A Rationalist Reply to the Challenge  
 
According to Moss’ anti-rationalist interpretation, the rational part of soul is 
not needed in discerning good ends: it is needed only for conceptualising them, 
deliberating about them, and articulating the reason for realising them. Once one has 
learned which actions are good, and has been habituated to enjoy acting well, one’s 
phantasia, which Moss interprets as an entirely non-rational faculty, suffices for 
discerning good ends. Rationalist interpreters have not, however, yet challenged her 
interpretation of phantasia, and her idea of applying this unorthodox interpretation to 
Aristotle’s theory of moral cognition. Let me attempt, however, to challenge it now. 
 I think that the most powerful argument against Moss interpretation would be that 
if it were endorsed, Aristotle would seem to be an incoherent thinker, unlike in the 
case of the rationalist interpretation. For Moss has not given us a compelling exegetic 
reason to think that the rationalist interpretation is incorrect. For example, the passage 
of DA 3.10‘[m]any men follow their phantasia contrary to their knowledge, and in 
all other animals there is no thinking or calculation but only phantasia’81could also 
be read as only confirming that phantasia often leads people to moral weakness, 
instead of (implicitly) claiming that phantasia and reason are ‘mutually exclusive’, as 
we have seen Moss take it to claim. After all, as we have seen, Aristotle also makes a 
distinction between rational and perceptual phantasia in DA. Although Moss suggests 
that rational phantasia could be only a name for using perceptual phantasia in 
deliberation, which requires its perceptions to be conceptualised, this reading is no 
more textually justified than the mainstream reading that assumes them to be separate 
aspects of phantasia: one that cognises without concepts, another with concepts.  
                                                             
80
 Ibid. pp. 212–213.  
81
 DA 3.10 433a10-11. Quotations from DA and DMA are from Moss 2011 and 2012. 
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  The other key passages outside EN that we have seen Moss to quote as supporting 
her interpretation, one in DA 3.3’thinking and understanding seem to be just like 
having a perception of something, for in both cases the soul discerns (krinein)…’82 
and another in DMA, ‘both phantasia and perception (aesthesis) hold the same place 
[in moral discernment] as nous, for all are kritika’83 are far from explicit in allowing 
that we can discern good ends without involving the rational part of our souls.  The 
context of the former passage reveals that Aristotle might not even agree with the 
claim he presents in it: the passage is presented as endoxa, from which Aristotle starts 
his discussion of phantasia. Although the philosopher does not explicitly reject that 
phantasia could be kritikon in DA, he argues later in 3.3 that [phantasia] is not the 
same kind of thinking (noesis) as krisis […] for phantasia is up to us […] but in 
forming opinions we are not free, we cannot escape the alternative of falsehood or 
truth.’84 At face value, this argument seems to imply that phantasia does not discern, 
because discernments have truth-values, whereas phantasmata as such do not have to 
have.
85
 With regard to the passage of DMA, Aristotle’s purpose is not to show that our 
non-rational abilities could have the power of discernment, but classify all human 
motivations ‘either into thought (nous) or desire (orexis),’ as he announces right 
before the passage (in the line that Moss omits in her quotation). In the quoted 
passage, Aristotle only classifies phantasia and aesthesis among motivations that 
belong to the class of nous that is, are of the rational part of soul, on account of being 
discerning (kritika). In the end, the passage may thus even seem to support the 
rationalist interpretation: if phantasia and aesthesis are rational motivations, then, 
surely, discerning good ends with them involves the activity of the rational part.  
 In EN, we saw Moss to appeal to this passage of book 3, chapter 4: ‘a virtuous 
person discerns each thing [i.e. good end] rightly, and in each case the truth appears to 
(phainetai) him, for distinctive things [potential ends] are noble (kala) and pleasant 
                                                             
82
 DA 3.3 427a19–22. 
83
 DMA 700b20-21. 
84
 DA 3.3 427b16-21. 
85
 My counterargument may not seem to be decisive, for Aristotle’s argument could also taken to imply 
that although phantasia can discern (e.g.) good ends, as endoxa suggests, it cannot discern whether 
these discernments are true or false, i.e. reflect the validity of its own discernments, which is the task of 
nous. However, I think this alternative is unlikely, since Aristotle’s words state that phantasia is not a 
discernment (krisis), not that it is a discernment in some qualified sense. Therefore it is safer to assume 
that phantasia needs the aid of reason to result discernments, i.e. rational phantasia (see p. 12 above).  
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 according to (kata) each character.’ 86  This passage does not, however, have to 
establish that virtuous people discern good ends by imagining (phantazein) certain 
ends as pleasant, as Moss takes it to tell. Instead of establishing a causal connection 
from an end appearing as pleasant to a virtuous person to his discerning that end as 
good, Aristotle’s claim may only establish a correlation. He may mean that the better 
one’s character is, the more reliably one’s sensations indicate the goodness of a 
potential end, although only fully virtuous people discern good ends entirely rightly. 
 Let me now attempt to show why we should prefer these my alternative, rationalist 
readings to what Moss makes up from the above passages to back up her anti-
rationalist interpretation. Aristotle’s motivation for dividing the soul into rational and 
non-rational aspects is the first reason. We have seen Moss argue that the division is 
not between our cognitive (discerning) and non-cognitive (passively perceiving) 
capacities, but only between conceptual and non-conceptual onesnon-rational 
phantasia does not need to use concepts, but can nevertheless discern ends as good. In 
this case, the division would not be, however, relevant to the question of which 
abilities one should develop to discern good ends, but only to the question of whether 
this discernment involves concepts or not. In EN 2.2, Aristotle seems, however, to be 
more interested in the former kind of question: ‘we study ethics not so that we may 
know what virtue is, but so that we may become good’.87 In light of this practical aim, 
it seems more likely that he would differentiate the capacities of the soul on the basis 
of whether they can discern which ends are good, not only on whether they utilise 
concepts. For the answer to the former question would help a student of ethics in 
deciding whether to include some intellectual education to his moral training apart 
from the habituation of non-rational desires, but the answer to the latter question 
would not have such a practical purport. Since the rationalist interpretation assumes 
that the division of soul is based on the division of cognitive and non-cognitive 
capacities, we have an initial, albeit small, reason to prefer it to Moss’ interpretation.  
      A more compelling reason to interpret Aristotle as a rationalist about the cognition 
of value, however, is that (at least) Moss’ reading of EN 6.13 is clearly less plausible 
than its rationalist alternative. Her analogy of two servants is not convincing. In fact, 
                                                             
86
 EN 3.4 1113a29–32. 
87
 EN 2.2 1103b27–8 (B&C).  
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 Aristotle seems to think its opposite by stating in the chapter ‘it is neither possible to 
be properly virtuous without phronesis, nor it is possible to have phronesis without 
virtue’.88 Instead of thinking that only a servant who acts well from obedience to the 
ends given by his master (who, in Moss analogy, stands for phronesis) would be truly 
excellentimplying that proper virtue is already developed virtue plus phronesisit 
seems he would rather opt that only the servant, who acts well on the basis of his own 
reasoning is at all excellenti.e., that any virtue presupposes phronesis, and is thus 
proper virtue. For example, in EN 1.4, Aristotle approvingly quotes Hesiod’s Works 
and Days: ‘the one is altogether best (ariston), who himself thinks (noein) all things, 
but good in his turn too is he who obeys one who speaks well’.89 Moreover, in EN 
6.13, right after the quoted passage, the philosopher seems to attempt to answer to a 
question that he presents in the beginning of EN 6.12: does it make any difference 
‘whether [people] have phronesis themselves or (only) obey others who have it?’90 
His explicit answer to this question (quoted on p. 6 above) is that only the people who 
have phronesis can act from the right reason (orthos logos), i.e., perform good actions 
for their own sakes, which is properly virtuous acting. Thus, it seems that according to 
Aristotle, if one acted well from taking the ends provided by her non-rational 
phantasia as givenassuming, for the sake of argument, that it can discern good 
endsone would not yet be truly excellent, or, morally virtuous, which would require 
also phronesis. It is therefore (very) unlikely, pace Moss, that Aristotle would imply 
in EN 6.13 that one can be morally virtuous without yet having phronesis.
 91
 
                                                             
88
 EN 6.13 1144b25–33. 
89
 EN 1.4 1095b10–11, quoting Hesiod, Works and Days 293. 
90
 EN 6.12 1143b30-32. 
91
 Recently, also Moss seems to have noticed the weakness of her analogy. In Moss 2014a, she admits 
that a rationalist interpreter ‘has to hand a much more substantive explanation [than an anti-rationalist] 
of phronesis’ difference to and superiority from cleverness [deinotes]: phronesis, she can say, is what 
gives one right end’ (Moss 2014a, p. 230, cf. fn. 24 above for my alternative interpretation). Thus, she 
now says that ‘it is reason’s,’ i.e. not only phantasia’s, ‘job to grasp what one’s character has fixed a 
goal and also recognise it as a goal.’ (p. 223) ‘This means,’ according to her, that desire obeys reason in 
the way that “someone obeys another when she says ‘I want F things, but I do not know what kinds of 
things are really F, and so I do not know if I want x, y or z, therefore I will defer to the counsel of my 
wise parent, friend or teacher.” (p. 239) These modifications prevent Aristotle’s division of soul in EN 
1.13 or his insistence for the necessity of phronesis for virtue in EN 6.13 from posing problems to 
Moss’ interpretation. Even her modified interpretation, according to which non-rational habituation 
determines whether one wants e.g. F things or something else (p. 233), is, however, vulnerable to the 
problem with Aristotle’s conception of moral responsibility that I introduce below.  
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       The final and, I think, by far the most compelling reason, however, is that Moss’ 
anti-rationalist interpretation about Aristotle’s theory of value cognition seems to have 
a serious problem with his conception of moral responsibility. Moss does not, 
however, discuss this problem. Perhaps she tacitly assumes that since, according to 
Aristotle, an adult is responsiblesubject to just praise or blamefor his actions if he 
performs them willingly (hekousion),
92
 and since the voluntariness of an action does 
not require it’s being (rationally) desired,93 one could be responsible for one’s actions 
even if one chose them non-rationally, by imagining them as pleasant. Such an 
assumption would, however, be mistaken. For Aristotle evidently thinks that mere 
voluntariness does not yet make an action morally assessable.
94
 In EN, the 
philosopher also says that both small children and animals act voluntarily,
95
 but are 
not responsible for their actions, unlike adults.
96
 Hence humans must achieve 
something in their moral development that animals cannot achieve, which renders 
them responsible for their voluntary actions. The most obvious candidate for this 
achievement would be developing a capability to choose what to do, independently of 
one’s non-rational phantasia or any non-rational desiresthis is, rational choice, or, 
prohairesis. Although Aristotle does not mention prohairesis while discussing just 
praise and blame in EN, he acknowledges it is needed for moral responsibility in EE: 
Since virtue and vice and the acts that spring from them are respectively praised or blamed -for we do 
not give praise or blame for what is due to necessity or change or nature, but only for what we 
ourselves are causes of […] it is clear that virtue and vice have to do with matters where the man 
                                                             
92
 Willingly performed, or, voluntary, actions are actions that elicit ‘praise or blame’, i.e., are subject to 
moral responsibility (EN 3.1 1109b34–5). In order to be voluntary, clarifies Aristotle, the action has be 
up to us (eph’ hemin) and not performed in ignorance (EE 2.9 1225b9). Some interpreters (e.g. Destre 
2012) think that being up to us means that the agent should have had an opportunity to act otherwise; 
some others (e.g. Everson 1990) stress that for an action to be called the agent’s own, it is not 
necessary that she could have acted otherwise. However, whatever one thinks about the correct 
interpretation of eph’ hemin, and the applicability of ‘could have acted otherwise’ -condition to 
Aristotle, that does not affect my thesis of the necessity of prohairesis for moral responsibility.  
93
 EE 2.7 1223b29–38: ‘we do many things voluntarily without anger or desire […] it remains then to 
consider whether acting from rational desire and voluntary acting are the same […] but no one 
rationally desires what he thinks bad, but acts so [voluntarily] in the state of akrasia […] it is therefore 
clear the voluntary then is not action from [even rational] desire […]. 
94
 One might think that so-called mixed actions show this already: When a captain (see EN 3.1 1110a8-
11) has to throw cargo away from his ship so as to save it from sinking does not justify blaming him of 
losing the cargo, despite he throws it away voluntarily. However, it justifies praising him of saving the 
ship. Therefore also he is responsible of what he didapparently because his action was voluntary. 
95
 EN 3.2 1111b8.  
96
 Aristotle claims that a mark (semeion) of morally responsible agents is that their actions are subject 
to legal punishments (EN 3.1 1109b31-5), which is of course not the case with animals or children. 
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 himself is the source and cause of his acts. We must then ascertain of what actions he is himself the 
source and cause. Now, we all admit that of acts that are voluntary and done from the choice 
[prohairesis] of each man he is the cause, but of involuntary acts he is not himself the cause; and all 
that he does from choice, he does voluntarily.
97
 
     Above passage establishes that prohairesis allows us to regard a person as the 
cause of his actions, and thus responsible of them. According to Aristotle, prohairesis 
is realised ‘when discerning with deliberation, we choose [with our reason] according 
to our rational desire’. 98  Thus, a choice of action made without antecedent 
deliberation, and the rational discernment of an end to be desired, could not be 
prohairesis. This being the case, it would be impossible for one to become 
responsible for his actions in the light of Moss’ anti-rationalist interpretation. 
Assuming that habituation to virtue is a non-rational process and, moreover, that our 
discernment of ends is a form of non-rational cognition, phantasia, which operates by 
associating the sensations of pleasure and pain with concepts, and somehow 
synthesising the mental pictures of the most desirable ends from these associations, 
we could not genuinely choose our ends and actions. It would thus be unexplainable 
why we consider most humans to be responsible for their actions, and justifiably so 
according to Aristotle. Since the rationalist interpretation gives us a way to credit the 
philosopher with a justification of our moral responsibility unlike (even) Moss’ anti-
rationalist interpretation, we have a presumptive reason for taking Aristotle to think 
that discerning good ends involves the activity of the rational part of soul. When we 
consider this conclusion together with our earlier considerations against Moss’ 
interpretation, we have, I think, a presumptive case for interpreting Aristotle as a 




  We have seen that if we did not need reason to discern good ends, but only 
phantasia that Moss interprets to be exclusively non-rational, we could not 
conclusively explain many things about Aristotle’s theory of the cognition of value. 
                                                             
97
 EE 2.6 1223a9-19. Translated by Solomon (1995). ‘Excellence’ and ‘badness’ replaced with ‘virtue’ 
and ‘vice.’ 
98
 EN 3.3 1113a11–12. Few lines before this definition, in 3.3 1113a6, Aristotle says that prohairesis 
occurs ‘in the ruling part of soul’, i.e. in the rational part. I have indicated this in the square brackets.  
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 For example: what is the reason for his division of human soul in EN 1.13? And if 
there is no reason related to moral improvement, what for we study ethics according 
to EN 2.2, why does he even divide the soul in EN? If he regarded any rational 
cognition of good ends unnecessary for moral virtue, why he considers proper virtue 
to involve phronesiswhich has cognitive access to the correct conception of the 
endnot only obedience to it, as his view e.g. in EN 1.4, that the best is who himself 
thinks all things and does not only obey others, testify? He even explicitly justifies 
this view in EN 6.13: only people that have phronesis can act from orthos logos, 
perform good actions on account of their intrinsic goodness, which is what 
distinguishes virtue from merely acting well. The most important and difficult 
problem for Moss is, however, the question why Aristotle considers us responsible for 
our actions, if this responsibility, as the philosopher acknowledges in EE, presupposes 
the capacity of choice (prohairesis)? If the discernment of good ends would be non-
rational, and depend therefore entirely upon non-rational habituation, as Moss thinks, 
we could not develop the capacity of choice and, hence, become responsible for our 
actions. Since the ancient rationalist line of interpretation, according to which we need 
to use the rational part of our souls in discerning good ends, can tackle with all these 









Achtenberg, Deborah (2002), Cognition of Value in Aristotle’s Ethics. Albany, NY. 
State University of New York Press.  
Aristotle (1933), De Anima (DA), Vols. I-III. Edited by P. Siwek. Rome: Pontifical 
Gregorian University.  
Aristotle, (1903), Ethica Nicomachea (EN). Edited by F. Susemihl. Leipzig: Teubner.  
Aristotle, (1995), Eudemian Ethics. Translated by J. Solomon. In Jonathan Barnes 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.9, n.1. p. 88-114, 2015. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v9i1p88-114 
112
 (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. II. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Aristotle, (1995), Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by David Ross. In The Complete 
Works of Aristotle, Vol. II. 
Aristotle (2011), Nicomachean Ethics (EN) Translated by Robin C. Bartlett & Susa D. 
Collins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Aspasius (2014), On Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1-4, 7-8. Translated by David 
Konstan. London: Bloomsbury. 
Aristotle, (1995), On the Soul. Translated by J. A. Smith. In Jonathan Barnes (ed.), 
The Complete Works of Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. I. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  
Bowdicth, Nathan (2008), “Aristotle on Habituation: The Key to Unlocking The 
Nicomachean Ethics.” Ethical Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 309-42.  
Caston, Victor (1996), “Why Aristotle Needs Imagination.” Phronesis, Vol. 41, No. 
1, pp. 20-55. 
Cooper, John M. (1975), Reason and Human Good in Aristotle. Indianapolis: Hackett.  
Dahl, Norman O. (1984), Practical Reason, Aristotle, and The Weakness of The Will. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Destrée, Pierre (2012), “Aristotle on Responsibility for One’s Character.” In Michael 
Pakaluk & Giles Pearson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 285-318. 
Everson, Stephen (1990), “Aristotle’s Compatibilism in the Nicomachean Ethics.”  
Ancient Philosophy, vol. 10, pp. 81-103. 
Irwin, Terence (2007), The Development of Ethics, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Kraut, Richard (1991), Aristotle on Human Good. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Lorenz, Hendrik (2009), The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Moss, Jessica (2009), “Akrasia and Perceptual Illusion.” Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie, Vol. 91, No. 2.  
Moss, Jessica (2012), Aristotle on The Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, 
Thought and Desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Moss, Jessica (2014b) “Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: On the Meaning of 
Logos.” Phronesis, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 181-230. 
Moss, Jessica (2014a), “Was Aristotle A Humean? A Partisan’s Guide to the Debate. 
In Ronald Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 221-241. 
Moss, Jessica (2011), “Virtue Makes the Goal Right: Virtue and Phronesis in 
Aristotle’s Ethics.” Phronesis, Vol. 56, No. 2. 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.9, n.1. p. 88-114, 2015. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v9i1p88-114 
113
 Natali, Carlo (2014), “The Book on Wisdom.” In The Cambridge Companion to 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 180-202. 
Polansky, Ronald (2007), Aristotle’s De anima: Critical Commentary. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Reeve, C. D. C. (2013), Aristotle on Practical Wisdom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Tuozzo, Thomas (1994), “Conceptualized and Unconceptualized Desire in Aristotle,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 32, pp. 525-49. 
Walter, Julius (1874), Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft in der griechischen 
Philosophie. Jena: Mauke.  
Zeller, Eduard (1897), Aristotle and The Earlier Peripatetics, vol. II. Translated by B. 
F. C. Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead. London: Longmans. 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.9, n.1. p. 88-114, 2015. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v9i1p88-114 
114
